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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

82-3046

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Soviet Long Range Cruise Missile Programs

FROM: Lawrence K. Gershwin  
National Intelligence Officer  
for Strategic Program

EXTENSION

NO.

SP - 70/82 NIC/DDI-3675-82

DATE

30 April 1982

25X1

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 70/82  
30 April 1982  
Copy 1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council - SR

FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

SUBJECT: Soviet Long Range Cruise Missile Programs

1. Within the last year we have learned a great deal about Soviet programs for development of long range cruise missiles similar to those the US is about to deploy. It now appears that the Soviets will begin to deploy sea- and ground-launched versions beginning in 1984 (as early as 1983) and an ALCM by 1985. We emphasized these developments in NIE 11-3/8-81, but I believe it will take months to sink in. The defense community has treated cruise missiles as a major US technological advantage, essentially a US monopoly. (In Harold Brown's January 1981 Annual Report to Congress he featured cruise missiles as a prime example of US technological superiority.) From the evidence on the vitality of the Soviet programs, and the preliminary characteristics and deployment dates we have assigned to the Soviet systems, the US advantage has shrunk considerably, although we judge that the Soviet systems will initially have less range and somewhat poorer accuracy than the US Tomahawk.

2. I believe it is a matter of some urgency that we communicate the significance of the Soviet cruise missile development program to the defense and arms control community. The recent NIE 11-3/8-81 does that, and I have been emphasizing it in my presentations and discussions. I believe it would be useful for you to discuss the matter at a breakfast meeting with Secretary Weinberger.

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SP - 70/82

SUBJECT: Soviet Long Range Cruise Missile Programs

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